Defendants and petitioners Walnut Valley Unified School District and the Board of Education of the Walnut Valley Unified School District (collectively, Walnut), seek a writ of mandate directing respondent superior court to vacate its order granting a petition for peremptory writ of mandate and/or prohibition (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1102) brought by plaintiff and real party in interest Rowland Unified School District (Rowland) and to enter a new order denying Rowland's petition.
The trial court's ruling precluded Walnut from enrolling for the 2010-2011 school year any students residing within Rowland's boundaries pursuant to the "District of Choice" program. (Ed. Code, § 48300 et seq.)
Walnut, which has declared itself a District of Choice, sought to process 590 applications from students who reside in Rowland for the upcoming school year. Rowland objected to the departure of any more of its students, contending it has already met the 10 percent statutory cap on the number of outbound transfers. (§ 48307, subd. (b).)
We are called upon to construe section 48307, subdivision (b), which enables a school district of residence to limit the number of students transferring out of the district. Thereafter, we address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination the statutory cap has been met in this case.
We conclude the trial court's legal interpretation of the 10 percent statutory cap is correct. (§ 48307, subd. (b).) Further, substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual determination the 10 percent cap on outbound transfers from Rowland had been reached. Therefore, we deny Walnut's petition.
On February 1, 2010, Rowland filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition,
First, Rowland contended as a school district with an average daily attendance of less than 50,000, it was entitled to limit the total number of pupils transferring out for the duration of the District of Choice program to 10 percent of the average daily attendance for that period. Rowland's average daily attendance for the years 1995 through 2009 was 17,527.60, so that it could limit the maximum number of students transferring out to 1,752.76. Because 2,054 students who resided in Rowland already had transferred out to surrounding school districts of choice, Rowland was entitled to preclude any further outbound transfers under the program. (§ 48307, subd. (b).)
In addition, Rowland contended it was entitled to limit further outbound transfers because the Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools (Superintendent) had determined Rowland would not meet the standards and criteria for fiscal stability for the subsequent fiscal year exclusively due to the impact of additional outbound District of Choice transfers. (§ 48307, subd. (d).)
Walnut disagreed with Rowland's interpretation of the 10 percent cap specified in section 48307, subdivision (b). Walnut argued the 10 percent cap had not been reached because 10 percent of Rowland's average daily attendance was not currently enrolled in Walnut.
According to Walnut's calculations, there were currently 742 District of Choice students enrolled in Walnut who originated from Rowland. Rowland's current year average daily attendance was 16,029 and 10 percent thereof is 1,602. Because only 742 Rowland students were currently enrolled in Walnut, Walnut was entitled to enroll an additional 860 students from Rowland. Therefore, Walnut should be able to proceed with the 590 Rowland applications which were pending before it.
On April 15, 2010, the matter came on for hearing. Prior to the hearing, the trial court issued a 10-page tentative ruling. At the conclusion of the hearing on Rowland's petition, the trial court adopted its tentative ruling as the order of the court. The trial court found in favor of Rowland on both grounds, i.e., the 10 percent aggregate cap had been met, and any further transfers of students would impair Rowland's fiscal stability.
The trial court ruled in pertinent part: "Under the plain meaning of section 48307, there are two circumstances in which a district of residence can limit the number of pupils transferring to a [District of Choice]: (1) a district with less than 50,000 in average daily attendance [(i.e., Rowland)] may limit the number of transfers to 3% of the district's current year average daily attendance; and (2) such a district may limit to a number which is 10% of the average daily attendance those pupils who transfer during the entire duration of the district of choice program.
"Walnut argues that the language `for that period' in the phrase `[the district] may limit the maximum number of pupils transferring out for the duration of the program authorized by this article to 10% of the average daily attendance for that period' refers back to `the current year.' Under Walnut's statutory construction, a qualifying district (1) may limit the number of transfers to 3% of the district's current year average daily attendance, and (2) may limit the number of transfers during the district of choice program to a total of 10%, calculated based on the current year's average daily attendance. Walnut contends that Rowland's interpretation would permit Rowland to count any student who ever transferred from Rowland under the program, whether the student is actively enrolled in another district, has graduated, moved, or enrolled in a private school.
"The plain meaning of section 48307(b) is just as Rowland states. The 10% cap on transfers out of the district of choice means 10% of the average daily attendance for the period of the district of choice program. . . .
"This plain language interpretation also is consistent with rules of construction that a qualifying phrase applies to the word, phrase or clause immediately preceding it unless context or evident meaning require a different
"An interpretation in which `that period' refers to duration of the program is consistent with the fact that section 48307(b) sets forth two bases on which a district of residence may limit transfers under the program—one in which the transfers are limited to 3% of the current year estimated daily average attendance and a second in which the maximum number of transfers is 10% of the daily average attendance for a period. The words `current year' occur with respect to the first basis, while both the phrase `that period' and the phrase `the duration of the program' occur in the second ground for limitation.
"The actual numbers involved in section 48307(b)—3% as an annual limit and 10% as a top limit—are consistent with Rowland's interpretation. Walnut's interpretation would mean that there would have to be 10% of Rowland's former students actively enrolled in the district of choice program on the date in question. In order to reach that cap, Rowland probably also would have already reached the 3% cap for any one year. As a practical matter, the 10% cap then would be partly redundant. It is far more likely that section [4]8307(b)'s 10% cap was intended to be an absolute cap on the loss of a residence district's students.
"Walnut relies on a November 3, 2009 letter by Senators Romero and Huff, the joint authors of Senate Bill 680 creating the budget limitation exception to the district of choice program. This letter states that the 10% cap is calculated based on the current year average daily attendance in the district of residence (Rowland) and the total number of transfers currently enrolled in the district of choice (Walnut). These numbers may fluctuate depending on the average daily attendance in the district of residence, and the active number of transfers, in the current year.
"The court cannot resort to legislative history unless the statute is ambiguous. The court does not find an ambiguity in section [48307, subdivision (b)]. Even if arguendo the statute is ambiguous, the SB 680 letter is not an extrinsic aid to interpretation because it does not state the Legislature's intent, but rather was sent after the amendment was enacted and is a post hoc interpretation by a bill's authors. See Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 30 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 520]. The letter is further not useful because the district of choice program was enacted in 1994. . . . The language in section 48307(b) is identical to former section 48209.7(b), which was enacted in 1994. Neither Senator Romero nor Senator Huff authored section 48209.7(b).
The trial court ruled: "It is undisputed that Rowland has had an average daily attendance of less than 50,000 since the district of choice legislation went into effect in 1994. That average daily attendance is 17,527.60. Thus, if 10% of that figure, or 1,752.76, have transferred from Rowland to other districts under the district of choice program, Rowland may impose the section 4[8]307(b) cap.
"Rowland presents evidence from an independent third party consultant that 1,940 Rowland students have transferred to Walnut and 114 students transferred to Hacienda La Puente during the district of choice program, a total of 2,054.
"Walnut contends that the independent consultant considered applications to transfer, not actual transfers. Walnut contends that only 1,411 students actually transferred to it from Rowland under the district of choice program. A number of applicants accepted to Walnut from Rowland either chose to remain in Rowland, enrolled in private schools, or moved to other districts and never enrolled in Walnut. Adding the 144 Hacienda La Puente students would mean that 1,555 students have transferred from Rowland under the district of choice program.
"There are serious problems with Walnut's evidence. First, although it contends that the evidence is based on district of choice transfer and enrollment records, it had no duty to maintain enrollment records. Indeed, Walnut admitted to the consultant that it had destroyed the district of choice records from 2002-2003, and did not have complete data for 1995 through 2003. Walnut's `AERIES student information system enrollment records' used to prepare the spreadsheet attached to the Declaration of Jan Keating are therefore suspect. Second, Walnut agreed to the appointment of the independent consultant to perform the accuracy of the number of students who had transferred from Walnut. The consultant's report is not limited to applications. It states that the report summarizes his review of the `number of Rowland . . .
"Thus, it may be that the consultant reviewed only applications and not actual transfers. But it is far too late for Walnut to assert that position now. More than 10% of Rowland's students have transferred under the district of choice program, and it is entitled to cap that amount until such time as 2,054 students no longer represents more than 10 percent of Rowland's average daily attendance over the duration of the [District of Choice] authorization. Thus, Rowland may prohibit [District of Choice] transfers; it is entitled to writ relief."
With respect to the fiscal instability issue, the trial court noted that in view of its finding the 10 percent statutory cap had been reached, it was unnecessary to determine whether Rowland also could prohibit the transfers pursuant to section 48307, subdivision (d), the fiscal stability provision. Nonetheless, the trial court proceeded to address the fiscal issue.
The trial court concluded "it is clear that the County Superintendent has determined that Rowland will not meet the standards for fiscal stability in 2010-11, not because it won't have sufficient reserves in that year, but because it will not have sufficient reserves two years out. It is also clear that this failure is solely attributable to the projected transfers to Walnut under the district of choice program. Without the transfers, Rowland would have a positive certification even though it has natural declining enrollment and State budget cuts will hit all schools."
In sum, Rowland prevailed below on both grounds. The trial court found the 10 percent statutory cap on outbound transfers had been reached, and that additional transfers of students would impair Rowland's fiscal stability.
On April 22, 2010, without waiting for entry of judgment, Walnut filed the instant petition for writ of mandate and requested an immediate stay of the
On May 13, 2010, this court denied Walnut's request for an immediate stay. However, because Walnut's petition raised a significant issue with respect to the interpretation of section 48307, we issued an order to show cause and invited amicus curiae briefing.
Walnut contends it is entitled to a writ of mandate to enable it to admit additional students from Rowland because (1) Rowland failed to establish the 10 percent cap on outbound transfers had been met (§ 48307, subd. (b)); and (2) Rowland failed to establish the outbound transfers would undermine Rowland's fiscal stability (§ 48307, subd. (d)).
In reviewing the trial court's decision "`on a petition for writ of ordinary mandate, the appellate court applies the substantial evidence test to the trial court's factual findings, but exercises its independent judgment on legal issues, such as the interpretation of statutes. [Citation.]'" (Committee for Responsible School Expansion v. Hermosa Beach City School Dist. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1184 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 705].)
Historically, each person subject to compulsory full-time education was required "to attend the school in which the residency of either the parent or legal guardian is located, subject to specified exceptions." (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 19 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1993, ch. 160, Summary Dig., p. 67.)
Assembly Bill No. 19 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.), approved by the Governor on July 20, 1993, was codified in former section 48209 et seq. (Stats. 1993, ch. 160, § 1, p. 1445.) This legislation authorized the governing board of any school district "to admit pupils residing in another school district to attend any school in that district, as specified. The bill . . . require[d] each school district that elects to accept transfers to adopt a resolution to determine the
In 2004, the District of Choice legislation was recodified in section 48300 et seq. (Stats. 2004, ch. 21, § 1.) The District of Choice legislation remains at section 48300 et seq. in an article captioned "Pupil Attendance Alternatives."
Section 48301, subdivision (a), reiterates that "pupils admitted under the [District of Choice] policy are selected through a random, unbiased process.. . ." School districts "are encouraged to hold informational hearings on the current educational program the district is offering so that parents may provide input to the district on methods to improve the current program and so that parents may make informed decisions regarding their children's education." (§ 48302.) Further, it is "the intent of the Legislature that every parent in this state be informed of their opportunity for currently existing choice options under this article regardless of ethnicity, primary language, or literacy." (§ 48314.)
The District of Choice program contains a sunset provision, making it finite in its duration. Section 48315 as originally enacted in 2004, stated: "This article shall become inoperative on July 1, 2007, and, as of January 1, 2008, is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which becomes effective on or before January 1, 2008, deletes or extends the dates on which it becomes inoperative and is repealed." (Added by Stats. 2004, ch. 21, § 1.)
In 2007, the inoperative and repeal dates in section 48315 for the provisions governing interdistrict transfers were extended to July 1, 2009, and January 1, 2010, respectively. (Stats. 2007, ch. 174, § 5.)
In 2009, the inoperative and repeal dates in section 48315 again were extended, this time to July 1, 2016, and January 1, 2017, respectively. (Stats. 2009, ch. 198, § 8.)
The crucial provision for our purposes is the interpretation of section 48307, subdivision (b), which authorizes a district of residence to limit the number of outbound transfers. We now turn to that issue.
Section 48307, subdivision (b), states: "A school district of residence with an average daily attendance of less than 50,000 may limit the number of pupils transferring out to 3 percent of its current year estimated average daily attendance and may limit the maximum number of pupils transferring out for the duration of the program authorized by this article to 10 percent of the average daily attendance for that period." (Italics added.)
With respect to the 10 percent cap, Walnut's petition to this court contends: "The proper interpretation of the 10 percent cap is to examine the total number of Rowland District of Choice transfers currently enrolled in Walnut
Walnut's argument flies in the face of the plain language of the statute. The plain language interpretation is that the 10 percent cap is based on Rowland's average daily attendance for the duration of the District of Choice program. (§ 48307, subd. (b).)
As the trial court found, Walnut's reliance on a November 3, 2009 letter authored by Senator Gloria Romero and Senator Bob Huff with respect to the interpretation of the 10 percent cap is unavailing. The legislators' letter, which was printed in the November 4, 2009 Senate Journal, asserted the 10 percent value is based on "the total number of resident district student transfers currently enrolled in a school district of choice." (Italics added.) However, as the trial court found, section 48307, subdivision (b), is not ambiguous in this regard. Therefore, Walnut's resort to this extrinsic material is inappropriate. (Hoechst, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 519.) Moreover, the legislators' letter cannot vest section 48307, subdivision (b), with a meaning it clearly lacks.
Further, as the trial court observed, if the 10 percent cap were based on the current year average daily attendance, the 3 percent cap based on the current year average daily attendance would be superfluous. (Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 776 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 838 P.2d 758] [interpretations that render statutory terms surplusage are to be avoided].)
We recognize our interpretation the 10 percent cap is based on the number of outbound transfers "for the duration of the program" (§ 48307, subd. (b)) makes it likely that eventually a district of residence will attain the 10 percent cap, so as to enable it to prohibit any further outbound transfers.
Assuming arguendo section 48307, subdivision (b), pertaining to the 10 percent cap, is ambiguous, so as to warrant delving into the legislative history, the legislative record is consistent with our interpretation of the statute.
The District of Choice program was most recently reauthorized by Senate Bill 680 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 680), signed into law on October 11, 2009. As amended on May 28, 2009, Senate Bill 680 would have modified section 48307, subdivision (b), as follows: "A school district of residence with an average daily attendance of less than 50,000 may limit the number of pupils transferring out to 3 percent of its current year estimated average daily attendance and may limit the maximum number of pupils transferring out for the duration of the program authorized by of the district pursuant to this article to 10 percent of the average daily attendance for that period." (Sen. Bill 680 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 28, 2009, pp. 3-4.) Thus, the May 28, 2009 version would have eliminated the 10 percent durational cap on outbound transfers.
The bill analysis of the May 28, 2009 version of Senate Bill 680 stated, inter alia: "4) Repeals the authorization for districts to cap the maximum number of students transferring out at 10% based on average daily attendance (ADA) for the duration of the program." (Assem. Com. on Education, Analysis of Senate Bill 680, as amended May 28, 2009, p. 1.)
The bill analysis of the May 28, 2009 version of Senate Bill 680 further stated: "
After considering the adverse impact of deleting the 10 percent durational cap on districts that had already attained the 10 percent cap on outbound transfers, the Legislature restored the 10 percent cap to Senate Bill 680, and the bill passed with the 10 percent cap intact. (Stats. 2009, ch. 198, § 4; § 48307, subd. (b).)
Thus, the Legislature is well aware of the 10 percent durational cap on outbound transfers and it has elected to leave the cap in place, in order to protect districts which already have lost 10 percent of their average daily attendance pursuant to the District of Choice program.
We also note the interpretation of the Legislative Counsel is in accord.
For the first time at oral argument before this court, Walnut contended the duration of the instant District of Choice program commenced not in 1994, but rather in 2004, at which time the earlier District of Choice legislation
Although the original District of Choice legislation was recodified in 2004, the Legislature has recognized the District of Choice program was established in 1993, not in 2004. For example, the bill analysis of Senate Bill 680 as introduced on February 27, 2009, for the Senate Committee on Education's April 15, 2009 hearing provides, at page 2: "The School Districts of Choice authorization for interdistrict transfers was initially established by AB 19 (Quackenbush), Chapter 160 of 1993. The statute was re-authorized in 2004 by AB 19 (Nation, Chapter 21) which extended the statute until July 1, 2007." (Italics added.)
Likewise, the bill analysis from the Assembly Committee on Appropriation's July 15, 2009 hearing on Senate Bill 680 refers to Assembly Bill No. 19 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) in 1993 as the initial authorizing legislation for the District of Choice program. (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill 680, as amended June 24, 2009, pp. 3-4.)
Thus, although the District of Choice legislation repeatedly has been reauthorized and extended since its inception, the District of Choice program commenced with Assembly Bill No. 19 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) in 1993, not with Assembly Bill No. 97 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) in 2004.
Further, the current durational cap in section 48307, subdivision (b) is identical to the durational cap contained in the original legislation. Former section 48209.7, subdivision (b), stated: "A school district of residence with average daily attendance less than 50,000 may limit the number of pupils transferring out to 3 percent of its current year estimated average daily attendance and may limit the maximum number of pupils transferring out for the duration of the program authorized by this article to 10 percent of the average daily attendance for that period." (Stats. 1993, ch. 160, § 1, p. 1445, italics added.) This italicized language from the 1993 legislation is continued verbatim in current section 48307, subdivision (b).
The next issue is whether the trial court properly found Rowland has reached the 10 percent cap so as to entitle Rowland to prohibit any further outbound transfers under the District of Choice program.
Whether 10 percent of Rowland's average daily attendance for the duration of the District of Choice program has transferred out is a question of fact. Therefore, we review the trial court's determination in this regard for substantial evidence. (Committee for Responsible School Expansion v. Hermosa Beach City School Dist., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.)
The record reflects Rowland's average daily attendance for the duration of the District of Choice Program, during the years 1995 through 2009, was 17,527.60. Therefore, Rowland was entitled to limit the maximum number of students transferring out for the duration of the program to 10 percent of that figure, or 1,752.76 students.
As the trial court noted, the third party independent review of Dr. Rudy Castruita determined that over the years, 1,940 students had transferred from Rowland to Walnut under the District of Choice program. In addition, 114 students had transferred from Rowland to Hacienda La Puente Unified School District pursuant to said program. Thus, a total of 2,054 students already had departed Rowland under the program.
Walnut argued the independent consultant only reviewed applications and not actual transfers. However, the trial court rejected this contention, stating "[t]he court cannot conclude that the consultant only reviewed applications."
This court cannot reweigh the evidence. We defer, as we must, to the trial court's determination the Castruita report established Rowland had reached the 10 percent cap. Therefore, at this juncture, Rowland is entitled to preclude
In view of our conclusion Rowland has reached the 10 percent cap on outbound transfers, so as to entitle it to preclude any further outbound transfers under the District of Choice program, it is unnecessary to address whether Rowland also has a fiscal justification for refusing any more outbound transfers (§ 48307, subd. (d)), or any other issues.
Walnut's petition for writ of mandate is denied. Rowland shall recover its costs in this proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.936.)
Kitching, J., and Aldrich, J., concurred.
